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Expressionism in Invisible Man and Catch-22 
The Banging of the Shoe: Recontextualizing Krushchev 
Anna Andreeva 
When Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev set sail for the United 
States from Kaliningrad on September 9, 1960, along with other repre-
sentatives of many other European socialist republics, nobody in the 
Soviet Union could imagine that two weeks later the leader they so 
much adored would be banging his shoe on the podium (Medvedev 
153). Such conduct gave rise to absolutely controversial reactions 
around the world ranging from bewildered condemnation to thrilling 
delight and put the Soviet vozhd, the Russian word for leader or chief-
tain, in the center of international politics. Needless to say that the first 
kind of attitude was significantly more wide-spread than the latter, and 
even the Russians did not appreciate this behavior. 
We can attempt to judge a speaker's performance only after we 
know the context in which it took place. Thus, in order for us to be able 
to determine whether Khrushchev's speech was effective, we need to 
examine the political situation in the world at a time. 
The Soviet-American relationship was deteriorating because of 
several crises that occurred in 1960. First, the Soviet Union was effec-
tively developing close ties with Cuba. Castro's victory in Cuban revo-
lution in January 1959 led to the United States' implementing an embar-
go on all the goods that have been traded with that country in the past. 
As a result, Russia along with other socialist countries became Cuba's 
largest exporter as well as importer for the next several decades. 
Second, a U.S. U - 2 unarmed reconnaissance plane, piloted by Francis 
Gary Powers who was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency, 
was shot down by Soviet military authorities 1,200 miles inside the 
Soviet Union near Sverdlovsk (Werth 300). Although the pilot was cap-
tured alive, this incident outraged the Americans who claimed that he 
was merely observing the weather conditions in Turkey. The Soviet 
Union subsequently demanded that President Eisenhower stopped all 
such flights and punished those responsible-a request that was never 
honored. Nor did the United States ever bring their apologies for what 
85 
The Corinthian: The Journal of Student Research at GC&SU 
happened. 
Keeping in mind that Khrushchev advised the American 
President not to come for a scheduled visit to Moscow because of the 
negative reaction Russian public might have, Eisenhower's administra-
tion was surprised to discover that Khrushchev himself would be pres-
ent at the United Nations meeting in New York in September, 1960. 
His decision was even more puzzling when one considered the fact that 
he never received an invitation from the U.N. Assembly (Medvedev 
153). However, such minor formalities never stopped Nikita 
Sergeevich. 
As we can see, before he even got to the United States, the 
American public sentiment was not in his favor. Moreover, it was the 
election year, and the country was in the midst of political struggle 
between the Republican Vice President Nixon and a Democrat John F. 
Kennedy. The arrival of a Communist ruler shifted the attention of the 
press and American citizens away from the presidential campaign 
towards the United Nations meeting. 
Khrushchev's intentions for the speech appeared to be very 
noble and praiseworthy. Several times throughout his address to the 
members of the U.N. Assembly he stressed the importance of "peaceful 
co-existence" (United Nations 1) between the two greatest powers in the 
world at a time. According to Nikita Sergeevich, "peoples of all coun-
tries-workers, peasants, intellectuals and the bourgeoisie ... want not 
war but peace, and peace alone" (1). So did the Soviet Union, he said, 
and added that his country put a lot of effort towards ending internation-
al tension. 
As he continued, however, it became clear that the Soviet leader 
was quite upset over the recent events, such as the U.S. spy-plane's 
"aggressive intrusion into our country" (2) and the economic boycott 
declared on Cuba simply because of Castro's taking over the govern-
ment. Khrushchev accused the American monopolies of exploiting the 
Cuban soil and industry prior to the socialist revolution and making a 
fortune at the Cuban people's expense, thus, defeating one of the major 
points of pride for the U.S.-its high standard of living. 
As an active supporter of the People's Republic of China, 
Khrushchev did not forget to mention his "friend" in the East and 
strongly suggested that it be reinstated in the United Nations (3) as it 
deserved to be treated with as much respect as any other nation in the 
U.N. Once again Khrushchev condemned the United States and other 
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western countries for intentionally isolating China and leaving it outside 
the scope of political recognition. 
While he continued emphasizing world peace on numerous 
counts during his speech, Nikita Sergeevich went on with his indictment 
of the United States administration by pointing out its apparent opposi-
tion to disarmament. In 1959 the U.N. adopted a resolution regarding 
general and complete disarmament, but, according to Khrushchev, "the 
absence of any progress ... is the consequence of the position taken by 
the United States and by certain other States linked with it through 
NATO." Moreover, Khrushchev justified the Soviet Union 's refusal to 
participate in the work of the Ten-Nation Committee entrusted with 
directing this programme by saying that "staying on in the Committee 
would only have meant helping the opponents of disarmament" (4). 
After suggesting that the United States withdrew its troops from South 
Korea, Khrushchev in a short paragraph made a radical proposal as to 
the executive organ of the U.N.-a thought that, in my opinion, should 
have been mentioned somewhere in the middle of his speech rather than 
leaving it till the very end. Such an unfortunate placement of a very 
important idea makes me question how serious Khrushchev was when 
making this crucial suggestion. 
Many others in the Western Hemisphere doubted his degree of 
seriousness as well. As Philip J. Noel-Baker stated in his Nobel lecture 
referring to Khrushchev's proposal of complete disarmament, "first. . . we 
must know: Is Mr. Khruschev genuinely sincere?" He then immediately 
followed with his own answers: 
First, perhaps no one knows if Mr. Khruschev is sincere, and we 
shall never know unless we start a serious negotiation with him 
without delay. Second, if we do negotiate, we shall know with 
in a week if he is sincere or not; that is certain. Third, if we do 
not soon start a serious negotiation on the basis of the mandate 
which the General Assembly has defined, then he may say, and 
others will believe, that it is we who are not sincere. 
Whatever the intentions of the Soviet leader at the United 
Nations meeting, his conduct was completely unexpected. At one point 
during his speech he took off his shoe and banged it on the table. One 
of his biographers speculated that this was designed to improve his 
image at home (United States); others believed that it could have been 
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"a symbolic, but ambiguous statement of support for Fidel" (Pravda). 
Nevertheless, it embarrassed a lot of his colleagues and associates who 
thought that such behavior was inappropriate for a leader of the world 
power. 
At another time during the U.N. meeting, while Harold 
Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, was addressing the Assembly, 
Mr. Khrushchev interrupted him with heckling shouts and table-thump-
ing (Whitman). In addition, he called the representative of Philippines 
"a lackey of American imperialism"-an unfair name for a delegate 
from a nation that won its independence not too long before that. Other 
examples of disregard for any rules of decorum were displayed by 
Nikita Sergeevich several times until the USSR delegation got a fine of 
$10,000 for violating the procedure (Medvedev 154). 
His performance received a wide disapprobation in the United 
States. Not only was it mentioned in the leading newspapers, such as 
New York Times, but it also came up during the Nixon-Kennedy 
Presidential debate later that year. When asked a question regarding the 
possibility of another summit conference with the Soviet ruler after the 
elections, Mr. Nixon replied that it is visible "only after Mr. 
Khrushchev-after his disgraceful conduct in Paris, after his disgraceful 
conduct at the United Nations-gave some assurance that he really 
wanted to sit down and talk to accomplish something and not just make 
propaganda" (Commission on Presidential Debates 11). 
We can consider Khrushchev 's speech effective in a sense that it 
focused everyone's attention on the issues presented in his address and 
made him one of the most popular figures (apart from Castro) at the 
meeting. However, discontent of the Soviets with their vozhd was evi-
dent. The same extrovert characteristics of Khrushchev's personality 
that brought him closer to people marked the beginning of his fall. 
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